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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
"I do not rule, I simply do my work"  
President Putin held a press conference with the foreign and domestic media this 
year, where, once again, he fielded questions on a range of issues from 
intellectual property rights to Orthodoxy and the role of nuclear technology in 
Russian security. 
 
Putin objected early on to a question about his rule and the choice of a 
successor, quibbling over the choice of the word rule, "I do not rule, I simply do 
my work."  (1) 
 
The topic of succession, raised early and returned to on more than one occasion, 
brought contradictory and, at times, prickly responses from the President.  When 
an NTV correspondent couched a question about the 2008 elections by 
mentioning Yel'tsin and his "habit of naming his successors,"  Putin testily 
answered, "I have said many times that there will be no successors.  There will 
be candidates for the post of president of the Russian Federation." (2) 
 
When a Reuters correspondent later followed up on the NTV question and asked 
Putin if he would, "as you have hinted you may do…indicate that you think would 
be best suited to becoming the next president?" and continued to press by asking 
if this "person (could) be a high state official?"   Putin responded, "Everyone who 
should be is already working as a high state official."  Putin added, "I reserve the 
right to express my preferences, but I will do this only once the election campaign 
begins."  (3) 
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Despite a previous remark that his successor was an unknown, at least at 
present, Putin now seems to suggest that the next Russian president is currently 
serving in an official capacity—an assertion that certainly fuels speculation over 
"known" successor frontrunners, such as Dmitri Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov.  
Putin's claim that he will express a preference for a particular candidate only after 
the presidential campaign is underway, however, could chill the ambition of 
would-be successors, who are unsure of the support they have from the current 
president.  Putin has positioned himself to remain central to the succession 
struggle, and yet simultaneously, above the fray. 
 
Putin also was questioned repeatedly on issues of corruption in the Russian state 
bureaucracy.  While he did assure his audience that prosecutions and 
investigations were proceeding and producing results, he opined that "The 
depths of the government are as deep as the oil and gas reserves of the Russian 
Federation, and it is certainly true that things sometimes disappear there." (4) 
 
Chasing shadows 
Speaking of successors, two oft-named candidates who have sparred verbally 
over ideology (of all things), namely, the meaning of the phrase "sovereign 
democracy" and the need, if any, for qualifying terms before the word democracy, 
recently appeared together on a "Real Politics" broadcast with Gleb Pavlovsky.  
First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and Presidential Aide Vladislav 
Surkov fielded questions from a meeting of One Russia's "young political elite" 
for the broadcast, and, of course, the question of terminology came to the fore. 
(5) 
 
Medvedev responded to the question of whether or not he and Surkov disagreed 
over the term "sovereign democracy" by saying that he and Surkov, who have 
been discussing the phrase for years, have "no major disagreements."  Surkov 
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joined in to explain that their disagreements are "only about terminology 
and…these are nuances." (6) 
 
Surkov continued to explain "nuance" to the audience by suggesting that he and 
Medvedev both enjoy the band Deep Purple, but Medvedev "likes the song 
Kentucky Woman and I like Lazy." (7) 
 
The exchange continued with Medvedev interrupting to assert, "I don't like 
Kentucky Woman very much [laughing] but I do like Deep Purple."  He then 
added, "Slava, [short for Vyacheslav] there are common songs that we sing 
together." To which Surkov replied, "But we won't tell anyone about them."  (8) 
 
For clarity's sake, Pavlovsky explained that the common songs to which Surkov 
referred were composed and conducted by the president.  Their appearance on 
the program clearly did little to dispel the appearance of tension among members 
of the apparat. 
 
Prosecutorial re-creation? 
The dismissal of Vladimir Ustinov and his replacement with Yuri Chaika did not 
mark the end of changes in the prosecutor's office.  Further shake-ups include 
deputy prosecutors; most recently, Deputy Prosecutor General Sergei Gerasimov 
resigned and has been replaced, apparently at Chaika's suggestion, with Ernest 
Valeyev, a lawyer and former public prosecutor for the Tyumen Region. (9) 
 
There are also suggestions that Putin is considering dusting off an element of the 
Kozak judicial reforms, which recommended, in part, separating out the 
investigative authority of the prosecutor's office.  (10) Investigations would be 
carried out by a new agency directly linked to the Kremlin.  
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Chaika may be moved over to head this new agency, but other candidates 
include Drug Tsar Viktor Cherkesov and the head of the MVD's Investigation 
Committee, Aleksei Anichin. (11) 
 
Potanin's staying power 
While many of the infamous "oligarchs" of the 1990s have been dispossessed of 
their Russian holdings, gone abroad, in some cases with asylum, or are sitting in 
jail, some continue to consolidate their positions within Russia.  Vladimir Potanin, 
who has been noted meeting with the president in the Kremlin on regular 
occasions, certainly has been able to maintain a comfortable living while 
remaining in Russia. 
 
Potanin recently took sole control of the once much sought after Norilsk Nickel, 
after the company's chief executive, Mikhail Prokhorov, agreed to resign from his 
post and "sell his half combined 54.8 percent stake in Norilsk to Mr. Potanin."  
(12)  Prokhorov apparently was motivated to sell both Norilsk and liquidate other 
elements of the holding company Interros, in which he and Mr. Potanin are 
partners, after a widely publicized arrest in France on organized prostitution 
charges. 
 
There is speculation that the move to secure Norilsk for Potanin is only the first 
step in an eventual resumption of state control of the enterprise.   As such, 
Potanin soon may find a majority buyer among the well-known Russian state 
firms with close Kremlin connections. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Transcript of Press Conference with the Russian and Foreign Media, 1 Feb 
07, Round Hall, The Kremlin, Moscow via www.kremlin.ru, accessed 5 Feb 07. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
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(4) Ibid. 
(5) NTV Mir in Russian, 2115 GMT, 3 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 2 Feb 07, 323 EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(10) Susan Cavan, "Kremlin judicial reforms draw fire from procuracy," NIS 
Observed, Executive Branch, Vol VI, No. 8, 2 May 01 via www.bu.edu/iscip. 
(11) Newsweek Russia, No. 5, 29 Jan-4 Feb 07; What the Papers Say (WPS) via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(12) Neil Buckley, "Norilsk Nickel comes under sole control," The Financial Times 
(London), 1 Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Chechen amnesty 
An amnesty for gunmen in the North Caucasus has come to an end amidst 
mixed reviews. It was proclaimed by National Anti-Terrorist Committee Chairman 
and FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev in July 2006, following the death of Shamil 
Basayev. The amnesty was extended several times but finally concluded on 15 
January. 
 
The announced results of the amnesty vary, depending on the source. Chechen 
Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov claims that 456 fighters surrendered, (1) while 
Chairman of the Duma’s Security Committee Vladimir Vasiliev stated that 546 
gunmen had come forward. Chechen Prosecutor Valeri Kuznetsov, on the other 
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hand, put the number at 467, and announced that, of that number, 90 already 
had received pardons. (2)  
 
Some observers, among them Novaya gazeta war correspondent Vyacheslav 
Izmailov, contend that the majority of the amnestied gunmen essentially had 
been pardoned before the amnesty and were counted only now for effect. (3)  
 
Among those pardoned in the current amnesty were former Defense Minister of 
Ichkeria (the separatists’ name for Chechnya) Magomed Khambiyev and former 
chief of Dzokhar Dudayev’s bodyguard, Abu Arsanukayev. Khambiyev is 
currently a member of the Chechen parliament and Arsanukayev is involved in 
the Chechen security forces. (4)  
 
Also among those named in the amnesty were three nephews of former 
Ichkerian Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. (Yandarbiyev was killed in 
Qatar by Russian security forces in February 2004.) According to RIA Novosti, 
the three men “wanted to return to peaceful life and work in their republic” and 
“had lived outside Russia until now.” (5)  In contrast, the separatist website 
Kavkaz-Tsentre claims that Yandarbiyev’s nephews were detained by 
“occupation forces” before the amnesty and then were portrayed in the media as 
having given themselves up. (6) 
 
What will those pardoned in the amnesty do now? They will contribute to 
rebuilding Chechnya, according to Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. 
“Virtually all amnestied people joined the process of restoring the republic: some 
work in law enforcement bodies, others—in agriculture and still others—in 
construction. They also include deputies and officials of local administrations.” (7)  
Upon closer inspection, service by the amnestied in the security forces seems 
especially likely. Although, in Kadyrov’s words, “Illegal armed formations are 
practically wiped out, their ringleaders either exterminated or tried and 
sentenced,” yet “the Kadyrov regiment is staffed with amnestied gunmen by 
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99%” and the “North and South battalions by almost 90%.” (8)  In point of fact, for 
most of the gunmen, surrendering one’s weapon in this particular amnesty may 
not mean giving it up so much as simply agreeing to use it for the other side. 
 
Don’t mess with Chechnya 
Two non-governmental organizations, the Russian Chechen Friendship Society 
and the Russian Justice Initiative, have come under fire from the state. Both 
groups have been very active regarding human rights cases in Chechnya. 
 
The Russian Chechen Friendship Society is one of the few that has continued 
reporting on the human rights situation in Chechnya. On 23 January, the Federal 
Supreme Court denied the group’s appeal to overturn the decision made to shut 
it down last October. The ruling was based on Russia’s anti-extremist legislation, 
under which groups whose leaders have been convicted of extremist activities 
may be closed down. In February 2006, the organization’s director, Stanislav 
Dmitrievskii, was convicted of “inciting ethnic hatred” (9) by printing materials 
authored by the now deceased former President of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov 
and his close aide Akhmed Zakayev. 
 
The Russian Justice Initiative, on the other hand, has been instrumental in 
presenting cases demonstrating human rights abuses in Chechnya to the 
European Court of Human Rights. It has won all five of the cases it has brought 
to the Court, resulting in both fines and embarrassment for the Russian state. 
The organization had its state registration, mandated under new NGO laws, 
denied once in November and a second time in January. 
 
The "victory" that the state has claimed in Chechnya is tenuous at best; Moscow 
will continue to suppress NGOs that look at the region with an inquisitive eye.  
 
Alkhanov on the way out? 
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Chechen president Alu Alkhanov commented in an interview with Moskovskiy 
komsomolets on 23 January that he did not want to continue as the regional 
head in 2008 when his term expires. (10)  Alkhanov is head of the region in title 
only. His prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov, son of Alkhanov's deceased 
predecessor Akhmad Kadyrov, is the subject of a virtual cult of personality in 
Chechnya—his picture is up on billboards, he has his own fan club, and he has a 
stadium named after him. (One Chechen television channel even offered an 
essay competition with the following theme: "Ramzan: A Hero of Our Time.  
Discuss." (11))  Kadyrov was widely expected to be named president in October 
2006 when he reached the requisite thirty years of age. 
 
Now, following Alkhanov's statement, Kadyrov has begun to position himself 
even more overtly as the region's next president. He initiated a review of 
Chechnya's executive bodies and, in a move that should prove very popular, also 
has announced that he will see to it that the cases of detained Chechens are 
brought before the legal system. Especially since the beginning of the second 
Chechen war, many Chechens have been held on false charges or without 
charge at all. By announcing that he intends to bring these cases to light, 
Kadyrov presents himself as a champion of the ordinary Chechen and someone 
who can bring stability instead of war. 
 
Kadyrov's drive for positive publicity has led to an interesting twist in his relations 
with human rights activists. Previously, Kadyrov has been accused repeatedly of 
being responsible for many of the disappearances that have taken place in 
Chechnya, as well as being complicit in torture. Now, in an attempt to reposition 
himself, Kadyrov has invited journalists and human rights groups to have 
unrestricted access to Chechnya. (12)  The chief offender is now the lord of the 
manor while the Kremlin continues to play the harsh and distant imperial 
overlord. But, trusting Kadyrov is playing with fire. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) “Duma-sponsored amnesty for surrendered gunmen proves effective,” TASS, 
16 Jan 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “We surrender; Chechnya cannot calculate how many gunmen surrendered in 
the amnesty,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 16 Jan 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Vyacheslav Izmailov, “Who has been given freedom,” Novaya gazeta, 24 Jan 
07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Security chief of late Chechen separatist leader surrenders,” RIA Novosti, 12 
Jan 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Chechen rebel site ridicules Moscow claims of mojahedin surrender,” 
Kavkaz-Tsentre news agency website, 15 Jan 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(7) “Duma-sponsored amnesty for surrendered gunmen proves effective,” TASS, 
16 Jan 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Olga Allenova, “Ramzan Kadyrov claims credit for the amnesty,” 
Kommersant, 16 Jan 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Russian court forces closure of Russian Chechen Friendship Society,” US 
Newswire, 23 Jan 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) "Chechen leader on amnesty, high-profile murders, economic aid, 
corruption," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 23 Jan 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(11) Andrew Osborn, "The warrior king of Chechnya," Independent Extra, 4 Jan 
07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(12) "Chechen PM invites journalists, rights activists, offers 'unrestricted access,'" 
RIA Novosti, 31 Jan 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
 10 
Military doctrine, round two 
Back in September of 2006, the Russian Defense Ministry was quick to deny 
press reports that a new military doctrine, which presents the main threats to 
Russia as emanating from NATO, the US and terrorism, was in the works. (1)  
After a brief lull, Russia’s military doctrine again is making headlines, this time 
with some more concrete evidence.  If indeed it comes to fruition this time, it will 
be the third complete iteration of a post-Soviet Russian Military Doctrine, with the 
first being finalized in 1993 and the second hitting the streets almost seven years 
later. 
 
On January 20, the Russian Academy of Military Sciences convened its annual 
meeting, inviting top law enforcement chiefs, defense analysts, and security 
officials to discuss a new military doctrine. (2)  Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
originally was scheduled to be one of the keynote speakers, although General of 
the Army Yuri Baluyevsky, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, ended up 
replacing him at the event.  
 
Baluyevsky began his speech with an apparent reversal of Ivanov’s policy 
regarding the transformation of the Russian military.  Specifically using the term 
“reformation” and stating that the process was as yet unfinished and would 
continue indefinitely, he seemed directly to contradict the Defense Minister’s 
2003 attempt to end “reformation” in favor of the less damning “transformation.”  
He then very specifically laid the groundwork for the new doctrine, by illuminating 
the primary threats to the Russian Federation as he saw them. (3)  Citing recent 
and drastic changes to the whole system of international relations, Baluyevsky 
identified the United States’ increasing influence in post-Soviet areas as the 
number one "threat," followed closely by NATO expansion to the east.  He 
envisioned threats from both developed and developing nations, however, and 
listed terrorism and local conflicts on Russia’s borders as areas of concern.  
Finally, in one of the more unusual subjects of discussion, he stated that the 
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growth of “hostile information activity” with respect to Russia was a significant 
threat. (4) 
 
No specific timelines were provided for the completion of the Doctrine, but 
General Baluyevsky stated that there were “plans for lengthy public debate.”  
Significantly, the lack of a current National Security Document to provide 
direction may end up delaying the release of a military doctrine. (5) 
 
Another key speaker was General of the Army Mahmoud Gareyev, who acts as 
the President of the Academy.  This speech concentrated on specific measures 
that needed to be taken, in order to counter the litany of threats the Chief of the 
General Staff identified.  First and foremost, he labeled an increase in defense 
spending to 3.5% of GDP (2.5% is the current rate) as an imperative.  He also 
advocated an expansion of the mobile reserve to create a seamless transition 
from peacetime to wartime footing.  Finally, he sought to increase the influence of 
both the Minister of Defense, by making him a Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and 
the Security Council Staff, by giving it the responsibility for responding to all “non-
military” threats. For reasons to be discussed later, this may be a not-so-
transparent effort to curry approval for the plan from the Defense Minister. (6) 
                         
There are a number of issues and unanswered questions that arise from this very 
open discussion of the Russian Military Doctrine.  First, of course, is the question 
of Defense Minister Ivanov and where he stands with respect to the Doctrine, 
reform and Armed Forces in general. In September, Ivanov stated that he had 
not “received instructions” to write a new military doctrine and denied that an 
effort was underway. (7)  Now, it seems that instructions have been given, but to 
whom?  His absence at the Academy's meeting concerning what is arguably the 
most important issue facing Russian the military is surprising.  It is interesting to 
note that Ivanov had the primary hand in writing the previous doctrine from 2000, 
when he was the Security Council Secretary. It also will be remembered that 
Ivanov took the opportunity at the last annual meeting of the Academy to criticize 
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both the General Staff and the Academy itself. (8)  Combined with the apparent 
disconnect with Baluyevsky over "reformation," his absence may indicate a 
serious rift between Ivanov and his military leadership over the doctrine. 
             
The hierarchy of threats also points to a significant change in Russian military 
thinking.  By stating that “cooperation with the West” has not reduced the military 
threat, Baluyevsky has shifted significantly the tenor of the last document.  No 
longer primarily concerned with terrorism and irregular (as opposed to 
conventional) warfare, this indicates a preference for more traditional standing 
armies.  In fact, this doctrine may represent a simple articulation of what already 
is programmed in Russian military procurement.  Both Putin and Ivanov have 
stated on many occasions that ninety percent of Russia’s national security is 
assured by their strategic nuclear forces. (9)  In fact, almost one third of Russia’s 
defense budget for this year has been earmarked for new weapons procurement, 
with seventeen new ICBMs slated for production.  These measures are needed 
to counter what Russia describes as “nuclear blackmail” by the United States. 
(10) 
             
Another course shift was indicated by the discussion of the “hostile information” 
against Russia.  Baluyevsky flatly told his audience not to “read the papers so 
much” or listen to “the experts.”  Although not explicitly stated, this may point to 
the much deeper issue of conflict over the environment and natural resources.  
Given the international criticism Russia received over the recent fossil fuel rows, 
first with Ukraine last year and then with Belarus earlier this month, it is 
understandable that this subject might be in the forefront of the military mind.  
Russian military analysts from the Military Forecasting Center already have 
identified the environment and energy as the leading causes of conflict in the 
next 10-15 years.  More specifically, they have stated that NATO leaders already 
are inclined to view changes in energy prices as a form of aggression. (11)    
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These factors add up to form a much more “angry” military doctrine than the last 
two versions.  Baluyevsky’s underlying assumption is that conflict of one type or 
another is inevitable, due to the rivalry between nations.  This, in turn, leads to 
the discussion of whether or not the size of the military should be constrained by 
what the economy can support, or whether it is simply threat-based and the 
economy must support the required military costs.  Considering that the projected 
doctrine seems to be entirely threat-based, with the most probable threat being 
peer nations, it’s not difficult to see which argument will win out. (12) 
             
Regardless of content, it may be a very tough “row to hoe” if Baluyevsky wants to 
push this doctrine through “lengthy public debate.”  In addition to the already 
discussed opposition he may face in civilian oversight, he also faces significant 
friction from the chiefs of the armed services.  Indeed, he took the opportunity to 
fire a shot across their collective bows when he opined that all of the services 
were pursuing their individual war planning, without regard for an overall joint 
strategy.  It’s a known fact that Baluyevsky has pushed for a restructuring to 
regional, rather than service-based, commands.  From a military perspective, this 
makes quite a bit of sense, but the commanders of each service have opposed it 
vigorously.  This new doctrine seems to be the perfect vehicle for Baluyevsky to 
attempt these changes. The opposition does not seem to be limited to only the 
service chiefs, with General Vladimir Belous, a noted defense expert, calling the 
proposed doctrine “common paperwork.” (13) 
             
Regardless of how the debate transpires, when round two of the great doctrine 
debate is over, it seems that there will indeed be a new strategy for the Russian 
Armed forces.  Although it’s final form has yet to be seen, at least in this round, 
the Russian top brass acknowledged that it exists. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
Turkmenistan military: a national labor pool 
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With the recent death of Turkmenistan’s President and self-proclaimed leader-
for-life, Saparmurat Niyazov, there has been increased interest lately in the 
stability and future of the resource-rich state.  Concern for the nation's 
vulnerability to both internal and external strife has increased in the wake of 
Niyazov’s death.  The turmoil began immediately when Niyazov loyalists within 
the People's Council (Halk Maslahty) convened an emergency session and 
replaced the constitutionally authorized interim President, Ovezgeldy Ataev, with 
Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov. The council also altered the constitution and 
changed the minimum presidential age from 50 to 49 so Berdymuhammedov 
could run legally in the upcoming election. (1)  Unfortunately, these high-level 
power struggles and corrupt practices will tend to propagate down through the 
entire government and exacerbate the nation’s problems.  At the same time, 
external powers with an interest in Turkmenistan’s abundant resources are 
keeping a close eye on the situation.   
      
In this time of increased instability, a reliance on the armed forces could become 
a reality in any number of different scenarios.  Arguably one of the strongest 
militaries in Central Asia, Turkmenistan spends more per capita on defense than 
any other Central Asian country.  With a population of just under 5 million, 
Turkmenistan spends “between 500 and 600 million dollars a year on defense 
and security.” (2)  For illustrative purposes, the military’s duty entails defending a 
population roughly equivalent to that of the greater Houston area, spread across 
a geographic area the size of California.  As the Turkmen Armed Forces 
celebrate their 15th anniversary, the force of 50,000 strong still closely resembles 
the old Soviet Army. (3)   
      
Turkmenistan’s military is constituted mostly of 18-year-old conscripts serving 2 
year obligations in one of several different branches.  Ground forces make up 
approximately half of the military population with 26,700 troops.  Additionally, 
there are “10,000 in the Air Force and Antiaircraft Forces, and 400 in the Navy.  
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Border Guards, Interior Troops of the Interior Ministry, National Security Service, 
and Secret Service (presidential bodyguards) total 17,800 men.” (4)   
      
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has remained 
steadfast in its effort to maintain a military-political line of “positive neutrality.”  
This staunch policy has kept the country from becoming too dependent on any 
single group or state for support, and from the undue influence of any external 
power.  Five basic policies taken together make up the definition of positive 
neutrality.  “First of all, [Turkmenistan] does not regard any nation as its enemy.  
Second, it will not join any collective bloc.  Third, it will not use arms against any 
nation except in self-defense.  Fourth, it will not maintain foreign troops on its 
territory.  And finally, fifth, the state will assist the world community in averting 
wars and armed conflicts.” (5)   
      
In addition to inheriting the military hardware and infrastructure left over from the 
Soviet era, the Turkmen military has pursued contracts with Russia, Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Iran for new and upgraded equipment.   In fact, the newest branch 
of the Turkmen armed forces, the Navy, has bought several warships and leased 
a destroyer and seven other boats from Iran. (6)  On the other hand, despite its 
pledge to avoid membership in collective blocs, in 1994 Turkmenistan became 
the first Central Asian country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) accord. 
(7) Turkmenistan also has maintained diversity in its sources of officer and 
technical training.  At nearly the same time that agreements were being forged to 
acquire Navy ships from Tehran, Turkmen officers were receiving military training 
at the Pentagon through the PfP program. (8)  Among others, Turkey and 
Pakistan also have been longtime providers of personnel training for Turkmen 
military members. (9)   
      
Most of Turkmenistan’s ability to fund the military—and entire country for that 
matter—comes from extensive exports of natural gas (reserves are estimated at 
4 trillion cubic meters).  “Georgia repairs military hardware (Su-25s) for the 
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Turkmen Air Force in return for gas. The Ukraine, which also needs Turkmen 
gas, promises Ashkhabad to repair four MIG-29s…and provide more than $500 
million worth of sophisticated military hardware.” (10)   
      
Despite being rich in resources and potential wealth, government corruption and 
mismanagement of export revenues have kept the country deep in poverty.  
According to the CIA’s World Fact Book, Turkmenistan ranks 4th worst in the 
world in unemployment at a staggering 60%, ahead of only Zimbabwe, Liberia, 
and Nauru. (11)  Interestingly though, before his death, president 
“Niyazov…sacked thousands of workers in recent years, apparently to save on 
government expenditure, even though the country should be earning a healthy 
income from gas and cotton sales abroad.” (12)  To fill the positions left vacant 
by these systematic firings, the leadership turned to the armed forces for cheap, 
and in the opinion of the government, under-utilized manpower.  “The state traffic 
police was turned over to the Defense Ministry last year, and the traffic is now 
regulated [entirely] by servicemen of the Armed Forces.” (13)  In overwhelming 
numbers, public sector jobs are being performed by the military.  Soldiers are 
working more and more in the fields of construction, health care (orderlies and 
nurses), transportation (train conductors, truck and bus drivers), and janitorial 
services. (14)   
      
In addition to contributing further to the already morbid unemployment problem, 
the practice of using military members to do public-sector labor also is crippling 
the readiness of the military.  “One regimental-strength unit guarding bridges 
across the river Amu Darya in the east of the country now has just 300 conscripts 
instead of 2,000 it used to have.” (15)  In order to satisfy the increasing demand 
for a free labor force, recruitment officers have had to begin pursuing people with 
physical disabilities and those who don’t even meet basic literacy requirements. 
      
Next week’s presidential election will usher in only the second post-Soviet 
administration and provide an opportunity for realistic, much needed economic 
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and government reform.  However, experts seem to agree that while some 
liberalization will occur, the president’s close control of the military and security 
services will remain essentially unchanged.  In a 26 January 2007 televised 
statement of congratulations and well-wishes, acting and likely next president 
Berdymuhammedov said that “care of the Armed Forces of the independent and 
permanently neutral Turkmenistan and its personnel has been and will remain a 
top priority for our state.  Further strengthening its material resources and raising 
its military power and social protection and support for our courageous defenders 
of our homeland and their families will always be in the focus of attention.” (16)  
Though this statement is somewhat generic, the gist of it seems to be saying “be 
ready for more of the same.” 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Middle East crossroads 
The escalating conflict between Iran and the United States presents Russia with 
a choice between abandoning an important economic and strategic partner or 
aligning itself with a radical Islamic regime against the world’s most powerful 
country. Until now, the Russian position appears to have consisted of avoiding 
either choice, and instead following a “middle course” between the two sides. 
Indeed, such a policy reflects Primakov’s vision of “multi-polarity,” which he 
mentioned in his overview of Russia’s achievements in 2006. (1)  A number of 
factors, however, indicate that in the current situation, a middle course may not 
be possible, and that whatever choice Russia makes will have a significant effect 
on the future direction of Russian foreign policy. 
 
Not surprisingly, given Russia’s penchant for supporting regimes of international 
notoriety (a feature of Primakov’s “multi-polarity” inherited from the Soviet era), 
countries associated with Russia in various ways have found themselves 
previously in open conflict with the United States. The most recent cases have 
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involved Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia in 1999 and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 
2003. In both of these instances, the main source of Russia’s objections to US 
military intervention seems to have consisted not so much of the specific ties 
between Russia and these regimes, but frustration at the ability of the United 
States to initiate military action far beyond its borders and Russia’s inability to 
prevent this. Moreover, since at least the Iraqi intervention was a source of 
widespread domestic and international controversy, Russia was able to express 
opposition that was not out of line with the controversy in the West. Thus, 
Russia’s opposition to US intervention in Iraq was shared more or less by official 
Paris and Berlin, a portion of the American public, and a majority of the 
population in most European countries. In fact, the US war in Iraq may have 
become a textbook illustration of Primakov’s multi-polarity – a situation in which 
the United States, despite its superpower status, made a decision which aroused 
widespread external, as well as internal opposition, which Russia was able to 
exploit to its advantage, effectively diverting most of the world’s attention from its 
own questionable international activities (such as in Georgia). Based upon such 
precedents, then the more regional conflicts in which the United States becomes 
engaged, the more advantageous it becomes for Russia. 
 
Regarding the current US-Iranian tensions, particularly over the issue of Iran’s 
nuclear program, it is remarkable how Russian rhetoric about the urgency of a 
peaceful resolution has coincided with actions that minimize the chances of such 
a resolution actually coming to pass. At a press conference on Thursday, 
February 1, Putin emphasized the need to “find such a variant of the atomic 
power industry development that would provide full guarantees to Iran, on the 
one hand, access (to such technologies) and on the other—would remove all 
concerns of the international community." (2)  At the same time, Russia has 
refused unyieldingly to impose any kind of international mechanism through 
which Iran would be compelled to verify that its nuclear program actually is 
confined to peaceful purposes. Thus, UN Resolution 1737, adopted in December 
2006, “Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA 
 21 
requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to 
resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports…” but does not 
specify any consequences for refusal to cooperate with the IAEA, beyond the 
scope of the sanctions spelled out in the resolution, which are limited to a ban on 
imports of material that could be used for enrichment or heavy-water production. 
(3)  Since these conditions do not account, in any way, for whatever material that 
already is in Iran, it is evident that the resolution is of little comfort to those who 
are concerned with Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and Russia’s blocking of a 
more binding resolution only makes the possibility of a diplomatic solution (to the 
extent that one is even possible) to the Iranian nuclear standoff more remote. In 
addition, Russia’s continued shipments of advanced weapons systems to Iran 
(most recently the Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missiles) encourage the Iranian leadership 
to continue to defy US pressure, again escalating tensions between the two 
sides. 
 
There are several principal factors that distinguish the situation concerning Iran 
from previous crises. One is that, while it is not commonly stated in Western 
circles, Russia actually is one of the primary causes of the conflict, being the 
main supplier of nuclear technology, material and know-how to Iran, since the 
signing of the contract for construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 
1995. Russia may not be directly involved in the production of nuclear weapons, 
but, according to GlobalSecurity.org, even the construction of the two light-water 
reactors at Bushehr theoretically would enable Iran to produce enough weapons-
grade plutonium in a year for 30 nuclear weapons. (4)  Officially, in order to 
prevent this from happening, Iran is bound by agreement, recently reiterated by 
Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov, to return all spent nuclear 
material to Russia and to have all transfers of nuclear material overseen by IAEA 
inspectors. (5) Nonetheless, if Iran is able to circumvent these terms and proceed 
with the development of nuclear weapons, the main responsibility for providing 
Iran with the means for developing these weapons would lie with Russia. If the 
worst-case scenario were to play out and Iran actually developed and then used 
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a nuclear weapon, Russia, along with everyone else, would be dealing with a 
completely different world from the present one. 
 
According to an editorial in Gazeta.ru, post-Soviet Russia has not had any real 
strategic partners, while the Russian leadership is plagued by a chronic 
unwillingness to make important political decisions. (6)  In any other situation 
where a war appeared to be imminent, this would be a perfect opportunity to stay 
neutral and make the most out of it. Given Russia’s role in the origins of the 
crisis, however, this may not be possible. At the same time, in supporting Iran, 
Russia risks finding itself on the side of a country that seems determined to take 
on almost the entire world; after all, Iran not only has threatened Israel openly 
and defied the US, but has attempted to bully the Persian Gulf states, to trigger a 
coup by proxy in Lebanon, and to project power in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps 
it is not surprising that the signals coming out of Moscow have been ambivalent. 
For example, just three days after the Russian Economic Development and 
Trade Ministry rejected a proposal by Iranian supreme ayatollah Ali Khamenei to 
form an OPEC-style gas cartel, Putin stated in a press conference that it was an 
“interesting idea…” and that “we will think about it.” (7) Putin’s next Middle East 
tour, scheduled for the middle of February, will take him to Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, countries that are all fearful of Iran’s ambitions, and with which he 
plans to discuss both arms deals (with Saudi Arabia), and possible gas 
cooperation (with Qatar). (8)  Once again, critical strategic decisions will have to 
wait; in the meantime, better to keep all options open—while it is still possible. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
GEORGIA 
Radioactive red herring 
No sooner had Russian Ambassador Alexander Kovalenko arrived back on the 
job in Tbilisi last month, than a story broke in Washington that injected new 
rancor into relations between Russia and Georgia. While on a state visit to 
Washington D.C. in late January, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili 
revealed details to the American media about a nuclear smuggling incident that 
occurred last year in Georgia. The story, published on 25 January in the New 
York Times and Associated Press and subsequently corroborated by officials in 
the US State Department and the Georgian Interior Ministry, was challenged in 
Moscow where it was labeled libelous propaganda calculated to discredit 
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Russian nuclear security in light of the country’s recent push to become a leading 
exporter of nuclear technology. 
 
In January 2006 a Russian from North Ossetia, Oleg Khintsagov, passed through 
the breakaway province of South Ossetia to meet with a contact in Tbilisi. He 
carried in his pocket a metal rock composed of three and a half ounces of 
enriched uranium, a sample of the two kilos of radioactive material to which he 
claimed to have access back in Vladikavkaz. Khintsagov’s contact in Tbilisi 
turned out to be a Georgian agent working on a sting operation together with the 
CIA. The smuggler was arrested, his contraband was seized, and soon after his 
trial in Georgian court, where he was sentenced to 8-10 years imprisonment, the 
radioactive trail went cold. (1) 
              
On the day that Moscow was set to release a memorandum on the construction 
of four nuclear power stations in India, the story of the smuggling incident 
reported in the Western media cast doubt on Russia’s ability to control its nuclear 
stockpiles, or so claimed Andrei Cherkasenko, Chairman of the board at 
AtomPromResursy, who was the first to respond to the story in the Russian 
media. (2)  By pointing to the fact that Georgian sources had reopened the story 
after a year of silence, he raised the question, “why now?” and suggested that it 
was no coincidence that the story broke alongside Rosatom’s announcement of 
nuclear partnership with India. Georgian officials in Tbilisi said that information 
about this “highly sensitive case” was confidential for a year because they hoped 
to obtain more details, but it became impossible to pursue the case further 
without Russian cooperation, which was not forthcoming. 
 
In an attempt to identify the seized material and determine its provenance, 
Georgian authorities sent samples of the uranium rock to Russian and American 
experts in the FBI, US Department of Energy and Russia’s federal atomic energy 
agency, Rosatom, in February 2006. The two countries’ experts all reached the 
conclusion that the material was weapons-grade uranium 235, enriched to 90% 
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and last processed over a decade ago. (3)  The critical question of the uranium’s 
provenance remains a mystery. Sources at Rosatom claim that the uranium 
sample provided by Georgia was too small to determine the country of origin. (4)  
If true, their claim underlines a profound lack of communication between the 
Russian security services, since it would seem to be contradicted by the contents 
of a letter sent by the Federal Security Services (FSB) to Tbilisi in May 2006 that 
reveals far more information than what Rosatom officials have been willing to 
acknowledge. The letter, confirming the delivery of two uranium samples, makes 
no mention of a request for additional material, but states that “in case of Russian 
origin the powder could be both an industrially produced and an experimental 
batch of a product.” (5)  This, along with the joint finding that the material had 
been processed a decade ago, led American experts to surmise that the material 
may have originated in one of Russia’s closed nuclear arsenals, a conjecture 
that, due to its highly confidential nature, would not be confirmed or denied by 
Rosatom. 
 
The obscurity perpetuated by Russian security services may explain Georgia’s 
decision to try Khintsagov in Tbilisi, rather than returning him to be tried in his 
native country, as was done in a prior case in 2003, when two foreigners 
accused of smuggling nuclear material were handed over to authorities in 
Armenia and Turkey. Although the FSB was able to use information provided by 
Tbilisi to identify Khintsagov positively and trace his movements across the 
Georgian border from 2005-2006, they were unable or unwilling to pursue the 
incident further and the case lay dormant for a year while Georgian authorities 
waited for Moscow to carry out further investigation.  
             
Georgia’s statement that Russia has refused to cooperate is borne out by the 
contradictory reports and defensive posturing coming from Russian officials. 
Kremlin sources have claimed that by airing the cold case Georgian authorities 
are trying to embarrass Moscow. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, told 
Interfax that he considers the Georgian report a provocation, adding that “we 
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would prefer that this very problem had been resolved by experts.” (6)  Rosatom 
issued a statement asserting that Russia’s nuclear materials are stored under 
stringent supervision. (7)  Deference to the authority of Russian government 
experts and security services is a patently inadmissible and disingenuous 
proposal, given the evidence of unchecked uranium peddling in the Khintsagov 
case. Questions of Georgia’s inopportune timing and recriminatory talk of 
provocation are no more than red herrings thrown out by Moscow to divert 
attention away from a grave security breach that has opened the way for criminal 
trade in nuclear materials. 
             
Georgia's revelation casts further light upon the chronic problem of its breakaway 
provinces. Statements made by President Saakashvili on the day the story broke 
called for a movement toward Georgian reunification, and the Khintsagov case 
provides the Georgian government with a compelling argument for the urgency of 
reintegrating its renegade provinces and reasserting control over the unpoliced 
territory within its sovereign borders. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become 
rutted with robbers’ highways, where traffic in illegal commodities can flow 
unchecked. The gravity of the threat to international security apparently is lost on 
the de facto leadership of the breakaway province of South Ossetia. When 
questioned about last year’s case of nuclear smuggling, the region’s foreign 
minister, Murat Dzhoyev said, “as concerns their claims that contraband, or 
moreover, the laughable claim that nuclear materials are going through South 
Ossetia, that's just funny…I hope not a single serious person in the world takes 
this seriously.” (8)  The case is being taken very seriously by at least one 
reputable person, American Ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft, who remarked 
that the case “highlights how smuggling and loose border control, associated with 
Georgia's separatist conflicts,” pose a threat “not just to Georgia but to all the 
international community.” (9)  
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Any move by Tbilisi to reintegrate its renegade provinces will require the stalwart 
support of Western powers. If they have to be spooked into defying Russia on 
this issue by the specter of black market nuclear contraband, so be it. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
What lies ahead for a post-Niyazov Turkmenistan? 
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With the recent death of Turkmenistan’s infamous president for life and self-
styled “Chief of the Turkmen” (Turkmenbashy), Saparmurat Niyazov, and new 
presidential elections scheduled for 11 February 2007, Turkmenistan’s citizens 
unexpectedly have been presented with the opportunity to gain, if not a 
democratic government, then at least a kinder, gentler autocrat.  (1) 
 
Niyazov was appointed First Secretary of the Turkmen SSR’s Communist Party 
Central Committee in 1985, and then became president in 1992, after the Soviet 
Union collapsed and Turkmenistan became independent. (2)  He was known as 
one of the world’s most oppressive and idiosyncratic dictators, responsible for 
such eccentric policies as a ban on car radios, ballet, opera, gold teeth, and the 
wearing of long hair and beards.  He also reduced public school education to 
nine years, (3) closed all rural libraries, and in March 2005 shut down all 
hospitals outside Ashgabat, effectively denying health care to thousands of his 
country’s citizens. (4)  Internet access and the media were strictly censored and 
political opposition was not tolerated; out of the handful of opposition activists 
who persevered and were not jailed, most were forced to seek asylum outside 
Turkmenistan. 
 
The late president’s interim replacement is Gurbankuly Berdymuhammedov, who 
prior to Niyazov’s death concurrently held the posts of Deputy Chairman of the 
Turkmen Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Health, and who is among the six 
candidates vying for the presidency in the upcoming elections.  There are signs 
that Mr. Berdymuhammedov already may have won much of the battle to secure 
the presidency: he has been named chairman of Niyazov’s funeral commission 
(under Soviet rule, this was often a way in which to identify the Party secretary’s 
successor), and he was selected as acting president by rather extra-
constitutional means.  According to Article 60 of the Turkmen constitution, the 
chairman of the Mejlis (Turkmenistan’s parliament), Avezgeldy Atayev, should 
have assumed the president’s duties, (5) however, Mr. Atayev is the subject of a 
criminal investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor-General, making him 
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ineligible to serve as acting president. (6)  He stands accused of “abuse of power 
and violation of citizens' rights” and is under arrest. (7)  The constitution also 
specifies that new presidential elections should be held within two months of the 
acting president’s appointment and that an acting president can not be 
nominated to run for the aforementioned office. (8)  This obstacle was handily 
overcome at an extraordinary session of the Halk Maslahaty (the People’s 
Council, which consists of 2,464 delegates and exercises many of the same 
powers as the Mejlis) (9) on 26 December, (broadcast live on the Turkmen TV 
Altyn Asyr channel), when the constitution was amended (10) in order to allow 
any candidate who receives at least one-third of the Halk Maslahaty’s votes to 
run for president of Turkmenistan.  The vote on whether or not approve the 
amendment was not broadcast live. (11) 
 
In addition to approving Mr. Berdymuhammedov’s candidacy, the council also 
voted to support five other candidates to run for the presidency: Deputy Oil and 
Gas Minister Isanguly Nuryyew, Deputy Head of the State Sports and Tourism 
Committee Durdy Durdyyew, Abadan Mayor Orazmyrat Garajayew, and 
construction engineer Annaberdi Copanow.  The candidates represent the 
country’s five provinces – by law, each province, as well as the city of Ashgabat, 
is permitted to nominate two presidential candidates for the Halk Maslahaty’s 
approval. (12)  Mr. Berdymuhammedov received the most votes, garnering the 
support of nearly all the council delegates, as well as the endorsements of the 
Central Election Commission and the chair of the Democratic Party 
(Turkmenistan’s ruling party). (13) None of the candidates represent any of the 
exiled opposition parties, which have been completely excluded from the 
succession process.  In fact, none of the opposition party leaders have been 
permitted to return to the country, much less participate in the election. 
 
Thus far, despite many predictions to the contrary by Russian and Western 
pundits, the presidential campaign has proceeded in a calm and orderly fashion, 
with all of the candidates continuing to sing the late Niyazov’s praises and 
 30 
pledging to carry out his policies.  However, there are faint signs that despite his 
publicly proclaimed devotion to his predecessor’s goals, Mr. Berdymuhammedov 
may have a slightly different set of objectives in mind for his country.   Many of 
his campaign promises call for overturning Niyazov’s policies, including his 
proposals to reevaluate the public school system so that Turkmen high school 
diplomas once again will be recognized internationally (which implies reinstating 
the 10-year school requirement); to send students to study in Western Europe, 
Japan, and the United States; (14) to review and possibly increase pensions for 
retirees; to provide all citizens with Internet access; to build new hospitals and 
health centers, as well as pharmaceutical factories and to send medical 
personnel abroad for training. (15)  This last proposal is particularly significant, 
because, as the late president’s Minister of Health, Mr. Berdymuhammedov was 
responsible for carrying out Niyazov’s orders to close all of the rural health clinics 
and fire their personnel.  The other presidential candidates have echoed this call 
for reform, pointing to various sectors of Turkmenistan’s infrastructure which 
need to be revamped, such as telecommunications, education, agriculture, the 
social welfare system, and the economy. (16)  No one has dared yet to point out 
that most of these reforms are at odds with Niyazov’s vision for his country, 
which, over the last several years, seemed to be aimed at forcing the population 
into an ever increasing state of poverty, ignorance, oppression, and isolation 
from the rest of the world.  Niyazov’s many monuments to himself continue to 
stand, his portraits still hang on the walls and the fifth book of his poetry was 
published posthumously. (17) 
 
Once Gurbankuly Berdymuhammedov is the president-elect and feels sufficiently 
secure in his power, he may begin dismantling Niyazov’s cult of personality.  
Whether such a move would be accompanied by political liberalization, or 
whether he will attempt to fashion himself into a second Turkmenbashy remains 
to be seen.  One thing does seem certain – due to Niyazov’s misguided policies, 
Turkmenistan now faces a number of economic and social crises and whatever 
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else he does, Mr. Berdymuhammedov will be virtually compelled to reverse the 
majority of his predecessor’s edicts, in order to avert a socioeconomic disaster. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Fighting for the pipelines  
On 6 January, Ukraine’s former Prime Minister and current opposition leader 
Yulia Tymoshenko and her allies were able to celebrate an important victory, 
when the parliament supported a bill to prohibit any reorganization of the 
ownership of Ukraine’s gas infrastructure.  
 
Earlier, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych’s ruling coalition had refused to place 
the bill on the parliamentary agenda.  But a blockade of the parliamentary 
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rostrum by The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our 
Ukraine bloc, coupled with the resulting media attention, forced Speaker 
Oleksandr Moroz to call the bill for a vote.  Once the measure was placed on the 
agenda, deputies with an eye on possible upcoming special elections, and faced 
with massive public opposition to any foreign ownership of the country’s energy 
infrastructure, had little choice;  all but nine MPs in the hall voted in favor. 
 
Ukraine earlier banned the “privatization” of all gas infrastructure, but this new 
law goes much further.  
 
The measure states, “The reorganization (merger, incorporation, separation, 
spin-off, transformation), concession, renting, leasing, mortgaging, privatization, 
or other actions to change the ownership of state trunk pipeline enterprises as 
well as the transfer of shares of such enterprises to the authorized capital of 
other companies shall be prohibited.'' 
 
In addition, "State trunk pipeline enterprises may not be declared bankrupt and 
liquidated under bankruptcy legislation.” (1) 
 
The law will at least begin to answer one of the opposition’s main concerns – that 
Ukraine’s state gas company, Naftohaz Ukrainy is being intentionally 
mismanaged in order to drive it into bankruptcy and create an opening for private 
ownership. 
 
The law also will put a stop to the apparent proposal of the Yanukovych 
government to provide Russia part of its gas transportation system in exchange 
for a stake in Russian gas extraction or a lower gas price.  Although the 
Yanukovych government is now adamantly denying that it ever would have 
considered providing any country with part ownership of its most lucrative and 
strategically important asset, there have been numerous statements in recent 
days that suggest just the opposite.  
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Russian President Vladimir Putin set off the alarm for Ukraine’s opposition during 
his annual press conference.  “We are talking about merging our assets,” he 
said.  “Our Ukrainian partners would like not only to form a gas transmission 
consortium, but also to have the opportunity to enter gas production in the 
territory of Russia.”  Putin called the idea “revolution,” and said, “There is 
interest.”  (2) 
 
Following criticism of the idea, Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov then 
suggested that “nobody will give anybody the ownership of Ukraine’s gas 
transportation system.” However, there were discussions about “joint 
management” in order to “receive cheaper gas,” he said.  According to Azarov, 
“joint management” would decrease the “huge sums” Ukraine spends annually 
on its pipelines to maintain them.  He failed to explain why Russia would absorb 
Ukraine’s “huge” expenses in exchange for the right to “manage,” but not “own” 
the pipelines.  (3) 
 
The day after Putin’s comment, a Naftohaz Ukrainy spokesman confirmed, “A 
political decision has been taken at the top level giving the green light for drafting 
specific projects by economic entities [Gazprom and Naftohaz] of the two 
countries, Ukraine and Russia.” (4) 
 
And further, Minister for Fuel and Energy Yuriy Boyko said, “Ukraine has made a 
series of proposals to Russia, and we have already selected a model that will be 
further developed and improved.”  (5) 
 
Finally, soon after Putin’s comment, an unidentified “Ukrainian source” told 
Russia’s Vedomosti that privatization of the gas transportation network was 
outlawed in Ukraine, but “if its companies are guaranteed access to Russian gas 
fields, Ukraine may change its mind.”  (6) 
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Or maybe not.   In fact, the simple suggestion that assets would be turned over 
caused the quickest policy about-face thus far for the Yanukovych government.  
On the state-owned and increasingly less objective UT-1 television station, 
journalists portrayed the passage of the opposition’s bill as “a small victory for 
The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc,” but “nothing new” since privatization of the 
pipelines already was banned.  In reality, said the commentator, the ruling 
coalition simply voted for the bill “for a quiet life” – a reference to Tymoshenko’s 
loud declarations.  
 
Regardless, the passage of the bill should send a strong statement to President 
Putin and members of the Ukrainian government who apparently expected no 
response to their statements and proposals.  Ukraine may be struggling to create 
a consolidated democracy, but its parliament is far from a rubber stamp and its 
opposition is far from cowed.  
 
In return for unblocking the parliamentary rostrum, The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
also demanded that a number of other bills be placed on the agenda; the vote 
results for these bills will provide interesting information about both the strength 
of the ruling coalition and the opposition.  
 
Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine unite…. sort of  
 On 5 February, The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine 
announced that they had signed an agreement to create a “joint” parliamentary 
opposition.   “Our joint opposition efforts will help eradicate as soon as possible 
the criminal-oligarchic authorities and revive Ukraine’s democratic and European 
development through disbanding parliament and holding early elections,” the 
statement reads.  (7) 
 
Tymoshenko immediately called the agreement “extremely important,” but this 
was not the impression given by some within Our Ukraine.  Several of its 
members immediately denounced the statement.  “I personally will not back the 
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outlined joint activities with the Tymoshenko Bloc,” said Our Ukraine Deputy 
Pavlo Zhebrivskyy. (8)  Former Prime Minister and OU member Anatoliy Kinakh 
agreed.  “I oppose the agreement which was signed as a result of a political 
trade,” he said. (9) Meanwhile, apparently without irony, OU Deputy Kseniya 
Lyapina said she was suspicious of the deal because it was unclear if 
Tymoshenko could be trusted to live up to the agreement. 
 
Tymoshenko and her allies likely will not be surprised by the confusion and 
division in Our Ukraine over the supposed deal.   Several agreements, including 
an intention to create a coalition government in Spring 2006 and the coalition 
government agreement itself, were quickly disavowed by some of Our Ukraine’s 
various factions.   What does seem clear, however, is that the leadership of the 
two former “orange blocs” is continuing to try to find ways to work together.  This 
is, at least, a start.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Status quo in Transnistria 
As the international community focuses on the Kosovo question, very little 
attention has been given to the “frozen conflicts” still plaguing the area of the 
former Soviet Union.  Perhaps the most “frozen” of these is Transnistria in 
Moldova.  
 
Since 1992 and the conclusion of a short civil war between Transnistrian 
separatists and Moldova, the region has been locked in a tense status quo.   
Legally part of Moldova, Transnistria (also known as Transdnestr or Dniestr) 
claims independence and has been maintaining itself separately – with the 
assistance of Russia.  
 
In a September 2006 referendum, Transnistria residents voted in favor of 
unification with Russia, although the result is disputed by Moldovan officials, who 
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point out that the region’s closed, unreformed Soviet-style society did not allow 
any debate on the issue or provide exposure to any independent media. 
 
Now, Transnistrian officials would like to use the Kosovo solution, whatever that 
may be, as a blueprint for resolution of their conflict.  “Our citizens have no fewer 
rights than Kosovo nationals,” the self-proclaimed Speaker of the Transnistrian 
parliament said recently.  “We are certain that the status of the Dniester 
Moldovan republic will not be lower than that of Kosovo....”  (11) 
 
Transnistrian officials earlier were buoyed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
comments one year ago when discussing potential Kosovo settlement scenarios.  
“We cannot accept a situation,” he said, “in which certain kinds of principles 
would be applied in one area and entirely different principles in another.” (12) 
 
Putin has backed away somewhat from those statements of late, but has 
remained supportive of all three separatist republics on the former Soviet area 
(the other two being in Georgia).      
 
Moldovan officials, meanwhile, have steadfastly refused to admit the possibility of 
any “Kosovo precedent,” and have pointed out that Transnistria sits in the middle 
of Moldova with no realistic possibility to join any other territorial entity.  
 
Regardless, Transnistrian authorities seem rejuvenated by the possibility that any 
sort of precedent for broad autonomy or independence may be set in Kosovo, 
and have agreed to resume talks with Moldova after over a year away.  
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